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Aim: The aim of this study was to examine the question of whether seizures of heroin, cocaine or 
amphetamine type substances (ATS) or supplier arrests for heroin, cocaine or ATS trafficking have 
any effect on the ED admissions related to or arrests for use and possession of these drugs.  
Method: Two strategies were employed to answer the question. The first involved a time series 
analysis of the relationship between seizures, supplier arrests, emergency department (ED) admissions 
and use/possession arrests.  The second involved an analysis of three specific operations identified by 
the NSW Crime Commission as has having had the potential to have affected the market for cocaine.  
Results: Over the short term (i.e. up to four months), increases in the intensity of high-level drug law 
enforcement (as measured by seizures and supplier arrests) directed at ATS, cocaine and heroin did 
not appear to have any suppression effect on ED admissions relating to ATS, cocaine and heroin, or 
on arrests for use and/or possession of these drugs. The three major operations dealing with cocaine 
listed by the NSW Crime Commission as significant (Operation Balmoral Athens, Operation Tempest 
and Operation Collage) did exert a suppression effect on arrests for use and possession of cocaine.  
Conclusions: Increases in the quantities of ATS, cocaine and heroin drugs seized by law enforcement 
authorities are normally a signal of increased rather than reduced supply. Very large seizures, 
however, may temporarily suppress consumption of these drugs. Even if drug seizures and drug 
supplier arrests have no short term effects on ED admissions and arrests for drug use and/or 
possession, they may still suppress drug consumption through risk compensation.  
Key words: supply control, heroin, cocaine, amphetamine-type substance, overdose, crime 
  
2 | P a g e  
 
Introduction 
Australia’s drug policy is founded on supply reduction, demand reduction and harm reductioni. 
Treatments such as methadone maintenance are effective in reducing the demand for illicit drugs 
(Ward, Mattick and Hall 1998) and harm reduction measures such as needle and syringe programs 
(Wodak & Cooney 2006) are effective in limiting the spread of diseases such as HIV-AIDS and 
Hepatitis C. Some, however, have argued that supply reduction policy has failed because Australia 
(along with many other countries) spends very large sums of money on drug law enforcement but 
illegal drugs remain readily available and widely used (see, for example, Wodak and Owens 1996).  
There is no doubt that Australia spends a large sum of money on drug law enforcement (Ritter et al. 
2013) or that illegal drug use in Australia remains widespread (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare 2011, pp. 8-9). However this does not necessarily mean that supply control policy has failed. 
Arguments to this effect ignore the counterfactual—we have no idea how much drug consumption 
and drug related harm there would be if the drugs that are currently prohibited were made more 
readily available. Indeed, if the co-occurrence of heavy investment in law enforcement and high levels 
of non-compliance with the law were evidence that law enforcement is failing, we would have to 
declare speed radars and random breath testing a failure on the grounds that, despite these measures, 
speeding and drink-driving remain widespread.   
Supply control policy does not need to create a scarcity of illegal drugs in order to reduce drug use 
and drug related harm. According to the Risks and Prices Theory (RPT) of drug markets (Reuter and 
Kleiman 1986; Caulkins and Reuter 1998), the severe punishments associated with conviction for 
drug cultivation, manufacture, importation and supply make these activities very risky. The 
consequent need to avoid detection makes drug production and distribution very inefficient. RPT 
maintains that drug traffickers compensate themselves for these risks and efficiencies by demanding 
higher premiums. These premiums are then passed onto drug consumers in the form of higher retail 
drug prices. Higher retail drug prices, according to standard economic theory, should lead to lower 
levels of drug consumption. To the extent that drug-related harm is a positive function of drug 
consumption, this should also lead to lower levels of drug-related harm.  
RPT has empirical support. According to Grossman, Chaloupka and Shim (2002), the black-market 
price of cocaine in the United States in 2002 was between 2.5 and five times higher than it would be 
in a legal market. The black-market price of heroin was estimated to be between eight and 19 times 
higher than it would be in a legal market. There is strong evidence these high prices result in lower 
levels of drug consumption. The sensitivity of demand for a product to changes in its price is what 
economists call its price-elasticity. An elasticity of -1.0 means that when the price of a commodity 
increases by one per cent, consumption of the commodity falls by one per cent. In his meta-analysis 
Gallet (2013) found price-elasticities of around -0.5 to -0.6 for heroin and cocaine and -0.2 to -0.3 for 
cannabis. Higher drug prices also mean lower levels of drug related harm. Dave (2005) found the 
price elasticities associated with cocaine and heroin emergency department (ED) episodes were -0.27 
and -0.10, respectively. He estimated that a 10 per cent increase in prices would prevent about 11,000 
hospital visits, with savings of between $21-47 million.   
More dramatic evidence that higher drug prices result in lower levels of drug related harm can be seen 
in the effects of the heroin shortage in Australia. Around Christmas 2000, the real price (i.e. price 
divided by purity) of a gram of heroin in Australia rose from around $360 to over $1,200 
(Weatherburn et al. 2003). In the period leading up to the heroin shortage, robbery and theft offences 
were all rising. In the eight years after the heroin shortage, robbery rates in NSW fell by 38 per cent; 
burglary by 50 per cent; motor vehicle theft by 56 per cent; and general theft by 37 per cent 
(Weatherburn and Holmes 2013). The fall in heroin consumption produced health benefits as well. 
Non-fatal opioid overdoses in NSW declined by 63 per cent between the onset of the heroin shortage 
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(December 2000) and June 2003, while over the same period fatal overdoses declined by 43 per cent 
(Degenhardt, Day, Gilmour and Hall, 2006).  
Higher drug prices may result in lower levels of drug consumption and drug related harm, but it does 
not follow that more frequent arrests of drug traffickers, more frequent drug seizures or larger drug 
seizures produce higher drug prices, lower levels of drug purity or lower levels of drug availability. 
Drug manufacturers or importers may expect to lose a certain quantity of their product to seizures and 
keep stockpiles to cover any shortfall. Alternatively, they may ship (manufacture or cultivate) more 
than is necessary to cover the losses they expect to suffer. The arrest of a key figure in a drug 
distribution syndicate may disrupt that syndicate’s business, but other syndicates may simply expand 
their output to fill the resulting void. If it can be shown that increasing the frequency with which drug 
traffickers are arrested or increasing the number or quantities of drugs seized drives up drug prices 
and thereby drives down consumption, a case can be made for higher levels of investment in supply-
reduction policy. If supply-reduction policy only affects drug consumption and drug-related harm 
indirectly, through risk compensation and inefficiency, there may be little benefit from higher levels 
of investment in supply control.   
Sophisticated attempts have been made to model the overall impact of supply reduction policy 
(Everingham and Rydell 1993; Crane et al 1997). Rydell & Everingham (1994), for example, 
developed a simulation model of the cocaine market in the United States in which potential users of 
cocaine flowed between three states: non-use, light use and heavy use. The model was able to give a 
good account of trends in the prevalence of cocaine use in the United States between 1962 and 1992. 
On the basis of the model, Rydell and Everingham (1994) concluded that further investment in 
supply reduction would be less cost-effective than increased investment in demand reduction. Models 
such as these are attractive to policy makers because they generate clear and unambiguous policy 
implications. However the predictions of any simulation model are only as reliable as the 
assumptions on which it is based. The US National Research Council, in its review of research on US 
drug policy observed that the then current models of the US cocaine market ‘rest on weak empirical 
foundations’ (Manski, Pepper & Petrie 2001, p. 157). Slight changes in the assumptions about the 
price elasticity of demand for cocaine and the outflow into treatment in the model developed by 
Rydell and Everingham, for example, have significant effects on the relative cost-effectiveness of 
drug law enforcement versus treatment (Rydell & Everingham 1994, p. 112). This would not be a 
problem if these two quantities were known with reasonable precision but they are not. While there is 
strong evidence that demand for cocaine is price elastic, estimates of the scale of that effect range 
from -0.42 and -1.26 (Gallet 2013).  
Direct evidence of the effect of seizures and supplier arrests is fairly sparse. In their review, 
Mazerolle, Soule and Rombouts (2007) identified four studies which examined the specific impact of  
supply control initiatives on drug use and drug related harm (Rumbold and Fry 1999; Weatherburn 
and Lind 1997; Wood et al. 2003; Smithson, McFadden, Mwesigye and Casey 2004). Three of these 
studies (Rumbold and Fry 1999; Weatherburn and Lind 1997; Wood et al. 2003) found no effect of 
drug seizures on drug use patterns, drug-related deaths or overdoses, treatment enrolment or rates of 
crime and arrest. McFadden, Mwesigye and Casey (2004) are alone in finding substantial effects 
from seizures. They observed that the decline in heroin supply in the Australian Capital Territory 
from July 1996 to April 2002 reduced non-fatal overdoses, crime and entry into methadone treatment. 
The period over which their study was conducted straddled the Australian heroin shortage. This was 
an exceptional event. To date, therefore, there is little evidence to suggest that ‘routine’ drug seizures 
are followed by a drop in drug consumption and drug related harm.  
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The current study 
The aim of the current study was to examine the impact of seizures and supplier arrests on the use of 
and harms associated with three drugs: heroin, cocaine and amphetamine type substances (ATS). 
Heroin, cocaine and ATS were selected for examination for three reasons. Firstly, all three are known 
to cause significant harm both to users of the drugs (Ross 2007) and to the broader community 
(Blumstein, Cohen, Roth and Visher 1986; Nurco et al. 1991; Degenhardt et al. 2005; McKetin et al. 
2006; Tyner and Fremouw 2008).  
Secondly, although the prevalence of heroin use has declined in recent years, all three drugs remain 
significant problems in Australia. According to the last National Drug Strategy Household Survey 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2011), in the 12 months preceding the survey, 2.1 per cent 
of those aged 14 years and older used ATS, while 2.1 per cent used cocaine. While the prevalence of 
recent heroin use is much lower (0.2 per cent), heroin use remains a problem in NSW, which in 2008 
accounted for 204 (58%) of the 351 opioid overdose deaths that occurred nationally (Stafford and 
Burns 2013, p. 93).  
Thirdly, seizures of and arrests for supplying these drugs are sufficiently frequent and variable to 
permit an examination of the effects of large scale seizures and high-level arrests. Border detections 
of ATS (excluding MDMA) have ranged in number from around 200 (in 2003/4) to over 1,000 (in 
2011/12). In terms of weight over the same period, they ranged from less than 50kg to nearly 350 kg. 
Heroin border detections ranged in number from less than 100 in 2003/4 to around 400 in 2006/7, and 
in weight over the same period, from less than 50kg in 2003/4 to around 400kg in 2011/12. Cocaine 
border detections ranged in number from around 100 in 2002/3 to more than 1,000 in 2011/12, and in 
weight over the same period, from around 50 to nearly 800kg in 2011/12 (Australian Crime 
Commission 2013).   
Our study improves on past research in three ways. Two of the four previous studies of the effect of 
drug seizures on drug markets have restricted their attention to one seizure (Rumbold and Fry 1999; 
Wood et al. 2003). In this study we examine all significant seizures of heroin, cocaine and ATS in 
Australia over a 10 year period (from July 2001 to June 2011). Rather than infer changes in 
consumption and harm from changes in drug price, purity and availability, we measure consumption 
and harm more directly, though ED admissions for drug overdose and arrests for drug use and 
possession. We use arrests for drug use and possession (UP arrests) as a supplementary measure of 
drug use because they have been shown in past Australian research to be strongly correlated with ED 
admissions for heroin, ATS and cocaine use (Nordt and Stohler 2010; Rosenfeld and Decker 1999; 
Moffatt, Wan and Weatherburn 2011). They also have the advantage (particularly in the case of 
cocaine and ATS) of being more frequent than ED admissions.  
Finally, in addition to conducting a general analysis of the effects of variation in seizures and supplier 
arrests we conducted an interrupted time series analysis of the effects of a single high-level drug law 
enforcement operation that resulted in the seizure of a very substantial quantity of cocaine and the 
arrest of several key players in the Sydney cocaine market. The distinctive feature of this operation is 
that NSW Crime Commission identified it, in advance of our analysis, as having the potential to have 
affected the market for cocaine.   
Since the effects of changes in the number of high level arrests or large scale seizures may only last a 
matter of weeks or months, we need to measure changes in consumption and drug related harm on a 
monthly basis. The consumption and harm measures employed in this study, therefore, are the 
monthly number of emergency department (ED) admissions for heroin, cocaine and ATS and the 
monthly number of arrests for narcotic, cocaine and ATS use and possession. We also include 
measures of the monthly number of recorded thefts, robberies and assaults, on the grounds that these 
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crimes known or though to be often committed by users of heroin, cocaine and ATS (Blumstein, 
Cohen, Roth and Visher 1986; Nurco et al. 1991; Degenhardt et al. 2005; McKetin et al. 2006; Tyner 
and Fremouw 2008). The question we seek to address is whether seizures of heroin, cocaine and ATS, 
and/or supplier arrests, have any effect on ED admissions and UP arrests for (a) heroin (b) cocaine 
and (c) ATS or on offences often committed by users of these drugs, namely (d) theft (e) robbery and 
(f) assault. More specifically, we are interested in determining whether there is an inverse 
contemporaneous or lagged relationship between any of the outcomes (a)-(f) and: 
1. The number of heroin seizures 
2. The weight of heroin seized 
3. The number of heroin supplier arrests 
4. The number of cocaine seizures 
5. The weight of cocaine seized 
6. The number of cocaine supplier arrests 
7. The number of ATS seizures 
8. The weight of ATS seized 
9. The number of ATS supplier arrests 
Seizures and supplier arrests in jurisdictions outside NSW were included because they may affect the 
market for heroin, cocaine or ATS in NSW. NSW was chosen as the site for an examination of the 
effects of seizures and supplier arrests because it has one of the largest markets for these three drugs 




As noted earlier, the study period extended from July 2001 to June 2011. Data on monthly 
drug seizures (weight and frequency) and drug supplier arrests were obtained from the 
National Illicit Drug Reporting Format (NIDRF) system maintained by the Australian Crime 
Commission. Data on monthly arrests of use/possess (UP arrests), theft, robbery and assault 
were sourced from the NSW crime and operational policing system (COPS) database. Data 
on heroin, cocaine and ATS ED admissions were obtained from the NSW Department of 
Health.  The ED data is based on diagnosis codes recorded in the "Presenting problem" and 
"Final problem" fields. These are entered by the Emergency Department clinician (typically 
the responsible medical officer)  following their assessment. Their diagnosis would be based 
on all available information, including history, examination, and laboratory testing where this 
was available.  
Treatment of seizure data 
Small seizures (e.g. a gram) could not reasonably be expected to influence the availability, price or 
purity of illicit drugs on the street. The selection of a weight threshold for seizures involves balancing 
the need to focus on seizures that have some potential to influence a drug market with the need to 
ensure that the drug seizures we examine are frequent enough to allow for meaningful analysis. We 
defined a seizure for the purpose of this study as a quantity of heroin, cocaine or ATS that lay in the 
top 20 per cent of the distribution of heroin, cocaine or ATS seizures by weight. The mean weight of 
seizures at or above these thresholds in each of the three drug type categories examined (along with 
the standard deviations) was: 
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• Heroin   173.46 grams (SD = 2129.48 grams) 
• Cocaine 267.13 grams (SD = 1825.71 grams) 
• ATS  326.69 grams (SD = 4146.59 grams) 
It should be noted that the mean weights for cocaine and ATS listed above, exceed the thresholds 
listed in Schedule 1 of the NSW Drug Use and Trafficking Act (1985) as the basis for charges of 
commercial trafficking in cocaine or amphetamines (250 grams). The mean weight for heroin, 
however, is somewhat below the threshold for a charge of supplying a commercial quantity of heroin 
(also 250 grams). Separate analyses of the effect of heroin seizures above 250 grams (i.e. heroin 
seizures in the top 14 per cent by weight) were therefore carried out. The results are not reported here 
(although they are available from the authors) because they followed essentially the same pattern as 
the analyses of heroin seizures in the top 20 per cent by weight reported below.  
Treatment of drug supplier arrest data 
The ACC classifies drug arrest data into two types, consumer arrests and ‘provider’ (i.e. drug 
supplier) arrests. A supplier arrest is any arrest of a person charged with any supply-type offence 
(importation, trafficking, selling, cultivation and manufacture), regardless of the quantity involved. 
Supplier arrests, as defined by the ACC, clearly include a wide range of players in the drug 
distribution process, from small-scale suppliers at street level to high-level traffickers involved in the 
importation and/or distribution of large quantities of illicit drugs. It might be argued that, even though 
we restricted our focus to seizures in the top 20 per cent by weight, only some of these seizures are 
significant (i.e. market affecting). As noted earlier, our general analysis of supplier arrests was 
therefore supplemented with an analysis of three specific operations identified by the NSW Crime 
Commission as has having had the potential to have affected the market for cocaine. The three 
operations identified by the Commission were: (1) Operation Balmoral Athens which in June 2010 
resulted in the arrest of four people and the seizure of 240 kg of cocaine; (2) Operation Tempest, 
which in September 2010 resulted in the arrest of four people and the seizure of 50 kg of cocaine; and 
(3) Operation Collage, which in October 2010 resulted in the arrest of three people and the seizure of 
450 kg of cocaine in October 2010. Because the arrests occurred over a five month period, they were 
treated as a single intervention. It bears emphasis that the NSW Crime Commission identified these 
three operations as significant solely on the basis of their own intelligence data. No indication of the 
results obtained in this study was given to the Commission in advance.  
Statistical analysis 
ARDL Model construction 
There are three challenges in addressing the research questions listed above. The first is that we have 
no prior knowledge of the lags involved in the process linking drug seizures or supplier arrests to 
drug outcomes. In other words, we have no way of knowing whether the effect of a seizure on 
overdoses or use/possession arrests will be immediate or delayed and, if delayed, how long it will 
take for the effect of the seizure to be felt. The second is the risk of omitted variable bias: factors 
other than supply side policy may affect overdoses, use/possession arrests and crime1. The third 
challenge is that the causal relationships we are interested in may be bi-directional. Changes in 
use/possession arrest rates may influence seizures and supplier arrests, a problem known as 
simultaneity. These problems must be overcome if we are to understand the true impact of supply 
side policy on drug markets.  
1Overdoses can be affected by changes in patterns of poly-drug use. Crime rates and use/possession arrests can 
be affected by changes in enforcement tactics or policy. 
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We deal with these problems using autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models. ARDL models 
provide a means of correctly identifying the appropriate lag structure of a time series while also 
controlling for omitted variable bias and simultaneity. The tactic is to explain the present behaviour of 
a series (e.g. overdoses at time t) in terms of its past values (e.g. overdoses at t-1, t-2, etc) plus 
measures of the variables thought to affect it (seizures, supplier arrests), plus a randomly distributed 
error term. By including past values of the series in the model we control for any extraneous factor 
that influenced the series up to the present point in time. Granger causality tests were used to test for 
simultaneity. If simultaneity was found among the variables, either the current value of the 
endogenous variable was excluded and only lagged values of the endogenous variable was included or 
vector auto-regression (VAR) was used to overcome the problem. VAR model is commonly used for 
modelling multivariate time series with causal relationships. Each endogenous variable has an 
equation explaining its evolution based on its own lagged values plus the lagged values of the other 
endogenous variables.  
In the study the dependent variables of interest (yt) include use/possess of drugs arrests, ED 
admissions for drugs, and drug-related crimes. The independent variables (xk,t) are number of seizures, 
weight of seizures (in kg) and number of supplier arrests from six different states and AFP. The 
ARDL model to be fitted has the following form: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝑦𝑡−𝑖 +∑ 𝑏1,𝑖𝑞1𝑖=1 𝑥1,𝑡−𝑖 +⋯+ ∑ 𝑏𝑘,𝑖𝑞𝑘𝑖=1 𝑥𝑘,𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑐1𝑚1 +⋯+ 𝑐11𝑚11 + 𝑒𝑡 (1) 
In Equation (1), p, q1, q2, …, qk are the largest significant lags for the dependent variables and k 
independent variables respectively; t = 1,…, 120 represents the month starting from July 2001 and 
ending in June 2011; xj,t , … , xj,t-qj represent the current and lagged values of the jth (j=1,…,k) 
independent variables xj and yt , …, yt-p represent the current and lagged values of the dependent 
variable. The terms m1, …, m11 represent monthly dummy variables to account for any seasonality in 
the dependent variable. The et represent the monthly residual error, which are assumed to be 
identically and independently distributed with a zero mean and constant variance (i.e. serially 
uncorrelated white noise). The lag order of p, q1, …,qk was determined based on the method described 
as follows. The method adopted in determining the model was to start on a reasonably long lag, say 
lag twelve, and shorten the lag by one period at a time until all lags had been tested or we reached a 
lag whose coefficient was statistically significant. The choice of lag was also influenced by the error 
structure of the residual errors. Increasing the lag order usually helps to reduce the autocorrelation in 
the residual errors. Ideally, the chosen lag order should be able to reduce the residual errors to white 
noise while at the same time revealing any significant coefficients on lagged independent variables. 
All the analyses were carried out using STATA 12.0. 
ARDL model diagnostic checking  
Before we fit the ARDL models, we need to make sure that the dependent variables and independent 
variables are stationary so that ordinary least square (OLS) method can be used to estimate the model 
parameters. To test if the series is non-stationary, the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test was 
performed with and without a linear trend in the regression model. If the ARDL model is correctly 
specified, it should be free from the following characteristics (1) simultaneity; (2) non-constant 
variance in residuals; and (3) serial correlation in the residuals. As already noted, Granger tests were 
used to assess (1). Engle's Lagrange multiplier test was used to test (2). The Ljung-Box test was used 
to test (3). Large p-values of the last two tests confirm that the model assumptions for the residual 
errors were satisfied in the final ARDL models.  
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Interrupted time series analysis of Operations Balmoral Athens, Tempest and Collage 
To test the effect of these three operations we regressed the number of cocaine UP arrests and ED 
admissions against an independent variable measuring elapsed time, a dummy variable indicating the 
onset of the operations (0 before June 2010 and 1 otherwise) and an interaction term between time and 
dummy variable. By using the dummy variable we are able to capture any change in the average level 
of UP arrests or ED admissions after the three significant operations. Adding the interaction between 
elapsed time and dummy variable allows us to measure any change in the direction of the trend after 
June 2010.  
Expectations  
Since our primary interest is to investigate the effect of seizures and supplier arrests on UP arrests and 
ED admissions for heroin, cocaine and ATS, the key parameters of interest are the coefficients b1,0,…, 
bk,qk. Positive/negative regression coefficients indicate that an increase in seizures or seizure weight or 
supplier arrests are associated with an increase/decrease in UP arrests and ED admissions. More 
specifically, a positive/negative coefficient (bj,0) indicates that when the number/weight of seizures or 
supplier arrests goes up by one unit, the UP arrests or ED admissions goes up/down by bj,0 units in the 
same month. Similarly, a positive coefficient (bj,l) indicates that when seizures or supplier arrests goes 
up in this month by one unit, the UP arrests or ED admissions by bj,l  units rise/drop l months later. 
For drug-related crimes, we want to test if the regression coefficients are negative as we are interested 
in determining whether heroin seizures and heroin supplier arrests produce a reduction in theft and 
robbery and whether seizures of ATS and cocaine supplier arrests produce a reduction in assault.  
Our expectation so far as the effects of Operations Balmoral Athens, Tempest and Collage is 
concerned, is that the interaction term and/or the dummy variable marking the point where the 
operations began will be significantly negative. The former would suggest that the operations in 
question altered the slope of the trend in cocaine arrests. The latter would suggest a change in the 
level.   
Results 
Preliminary analysis 
The analysis began by fitting ten ARDL models using two sets of independent variables (number and 
weight of seizures and number of supplier arrests, from all states and AFP) to five different outcome 
variables in NSW: UP arrests, ED admissions, theft, assaults and robbery. This was done to address 
the possibility that supplier arrests and seizures in States and Territories other than NSW could 
influence drug markets and drug-related crime in NSW. At this stage, no restriction was imposed on 
the weight of a drug that constituted a ‘seizure’. The results of these ARDL models are summarised in 
Tables A1 (heroin), A2 (cocaine) and A3 (ATS) in the Appendix. It suffices to note here there that no 
consistent pattern of results could be found for any of the three drugs.  
Preliminary analysis revealed no consistent relationships with the UP arrests or ED admissions for 
any of the three drugs in any state other than NSW. The analysis that follows is therefore limited to 
seizures, supplier arrests, use/possession arrests and drug-related crime in NSW. The results are 
presented in three sections. First we present basic descriptive statistics on the variables included in the 
study separately for each jurisdiction. Next we present the results of ARDL modelling. Finally we 
present the results of the interrupted time series analysis carried out on a series of operations carried 
out by the NSW Crime Commission to disrupt the market for cocaine.  
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Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 shows the mean monthly number of seizures, monthly weight of drugs seized and monthly 
number of supplier arrests in NSW. Also shown are the standard deviation (SD), minimum and 
maximum values; and the results of an augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test conducted to see if the 
series are stationary. The test results show that all of the series are stationary and the ARDL models 
can be fitted without differencing. 
Table 1. Descriptive summary for dependent and independent variables in NSW  
Variables Mean  SD Minimum  Maximum  Unit root test 
UP arrests of ATS 263.67 85.00 141 533 stationary 
UP arrests of cocaine 29.86 18.63 3 98 stationary 
UP arrests of heroin 69.34 16.19 35 105 stationary 
ED admissions for ATS 28.03 8.48 12 55 stationary 
ED admissions for cocaine 5.18 2.74 0 13 stationary 
ED admissions for heroin  62.08 13.56 32 108 stationary 
Property crime  25554.9 4731.0 19366 38928 trend stationary 
Assaults 5821.93 506.96 4956 6920 stationary 
Robbery  650.96 175.01 351 1133 stationary 
Number of seizure of ATS 286.91 114.32 118 512 stationary 
Number of seizure of cocaine 33.42 19.88 2 82 stationary 
Number of seizure of heroin 56.43 14.30 26 113 stationary 
Weight of seizure of ATS (grams) 19.11 36.06 0.84 236.15 stationary 
Weight of seizure of cocaine (grams) 1.84 4.66 0.01 39.01 stationary 
Weight of seizure of heroin (grams) 2.00 7.13 0.03 70.55 stationary 
Number of supplier arrests of ATS 65.82 31.17 18 127 stationary 
Number of supplier arrests of cocaine 9.43 5.90 0 26 stationary 
Number of supplier arrests of heroin 20.50 8.57 5 48 stationary 
Trends in the number of drug seizures, the number of supplier arrests, the number of UP arrests, the 
number of ED admissions and the weight of drugs seized (right hand axis) in NSW are shown in 
Figures 1 (heroin), 2 (cocaine) and 3 (ATS) below.  
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 For heroin, Figure 1 indicates that the UP arrests, ED admissions number of seizures and supplier 
arrests in NSW all followed a similar trend . The trend was relatively stable with a small dip in 2006. 
The number of seizures, supplier arrests and UP arrests for cocaine in NSW demonstrated similar 
trend to that of heroin (see Figure 2). After a downtrend occurred in 2002, the three series continued 
to rise till 2010 at which point they became stable again. The ED admissions for cocaine did not show 
any similar increasing trend after 2006. For ATS, Figure 3 shows that the number of seizures and UP 
arrests followed each other quite closely. The two series had an uptrend throughout the study period 
with a higher increase rate after January 2006 but slowed down again and became more volatile 
around 2010. The ED admissions for ATS remained flat throughout the study period, while the 
number of supplier arrests rose substantially in mid 2005 and remained stable after mid 2006. The 
correlation between the number of seizures and the number of supplier arrests are high in NSW for 
heroin, cocaine and ATS. To avoid the problem of multicollinearity seizures and supplier arrests were 
incorporated in separate ARDL models of their effects on UP arrests, ED admissions and drug-related 
crimes. 
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ARDL model results 
The results for UP arrests and ED admissions are shown in Tables 8 (heroin), 9 (cocaine) and 10 
(ATS) below.  
Table 2: Summary of reduced ARDL model results for heroin 
Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
UP arrests ED admissions 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
Number of seizures 0.725    0.549      
Weight of seizures -0.163 0.220 0.215        
Number of supplier arrests 0.354       -0.310   
 
Diagnostic checking p-value    p-value    
M1 M2    M1 M2    
Ljung-Box test (up to lag 24) .327 .476     .562    
Engle’s LM test .881 .631     .163    
Granger causality test p-value          
Number of seizures .474          
Weight of seizures .065          
Number of supplier arrests .054          
Note: M1 refers the ARDL model using number and weight of seizures as independent variables; M2 refers to the model 
with number of supplier arrests as independent variable. 
Table 3: Summary of reduced ARDL model results for cocaine 
Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
UP arrests ED admissions 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
Number of seizures 1.052      0.175    
Weight of seizures           
Number of supplier arrests        0.156   
 
Diagnostic checking p-value    p-value    
M1 M2    M1 M2    
Ljung-Box test (up to lag 24) .372 .146    .436 .628    
Engle’s LM test .728 .235    .782 .948    
Granger causality test p-value          
Number of seizures .130          
Table 4: Summary of reduced ARDL model results for ATS 
Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
UP arrests ED admissions 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
Number of seizures 1.162          
Weight of seizures           
Number of supplier arrests 0.578          
 
Diagnostic checking p-value         
M1 M2         
Ljung-Box test (up to lag 24) .073 .192         
Engle’s LM test .075 .195         
Granger causality test p-value          
Number of seizures .067          
Number of supplier arrests .143          
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Table 2 indicates that when the number of large-scale seizures of heroin increases by 10 units, UP 
arrests go up by 7.25 units in the same time period and by 5.49 units four months later. Similarly, if 
the number of supplier arrests of heroin increases by 10 units, the UP arrests in NSW go up by 3.54 
units in the same time period. Notice, however, that there is a significant negative contemporaneous 
relationship between the quantity of heroin seized in a particular month and the number of UP arrests 
in the same month. There is also a significant negative relationship between the number of supplier 
arrests in a given month and the number of ED admissions two months later.  
The results for cocaine and ATS are shown in Table 3. A 10 unit increase in the number of cocaine 
seizures is associated with a contemporaneous 10.52 unit increase in the number of UP arrests for 
cocaine. Positive effects are also found in relation to cocaine ED admissions. When the number of 
seizures increases by 10 units, ED admissions for cocaine increase by 1.75 units one month later. 
When the number of supplier arrests rises by 10 units, ED admissions for cocaine increase by 1.56 
units two months later. In the case of ATS (Table 4), the number of seizures and supplier arrests are 
both significantly and contemporaneously related to UP arrests. When the number of large-scale 
seizures increases by 10 units, ATS UP arrests jump up by 11.62 units. Similarly, when the number of 
ATS supplier arrests increases by 10 units, the number of UP arrests goes up by 5.78 units.  
No consistent effects of supply control measures (seizure frequency, seizure weight, supplier arrests) 
were found for theft, robbery or assault (see Tables A4 to A6 of the Appendix). In fact in most 
instances, no significant effect of any kind was found. Where significant effects were found, they 
were often inconsistent. An increase in the monthly weight of heroin seized, for example, was 
associated with an increase in theft offences at lag one and a decrease in theft offences at lag four. 
Increases in the monthly weight of cocaine seized were associated with an increase in assault at lag 1 
and an increase in robbery at lag 4 but increases in the number of cocaine seizures or the number of 
cocaine supplier arrests were associated with decreases in theft offences at lag 1.  
Interrupted time series analysis 
Figure 4 below shows the results of the first interrupted time series analysis on UP arrests of cocaine. 
The vertical line in June 2010 marks the point where the first of the three major cocaine operations 
began. The fitted line shows the modelled trend before and after the operation and those which 
followed.  
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 Rates of UP arrest for cocaine can be seen to increase up to June 2010 and then level off. According 
to the fitted values, there was an uptrend prior to June 2010 and the trend turned downwards 
afterwards. This suggests that the three operations lead to a drop in the UP arrests in NSW. The result 
of the interrupted time series analysis are summarised in Table 5.  
Table 5. Results for interrupted time series analysis on UP arrests of cocaine in NSW during 
January 2007 and December 2011 
Variable Estimate SE p-value 
time  1.214 0.163 <.001 
dummy variable 173.387 81.902 .039 
time*dummy -1.440 0.621 .024 
constant -87.677 16.404 <.001 
The results indicate that the interaction between time and the dummy variable is significantly negative 
and this confirms a change in the trend of UP arrests after June 2010.  
Figure 5 indicates the observed series and fitted trends for ED admissions of cocaine from the 
interrupted time series analysis. ED admissions remained stable before June 2010 but dipped sharply 
immediately after the three operations before it rose again in mid 2011. They then bounced back to 
their original level. This suggests that the three operations also lead to a drop in the ED admissions in 
NSW. The result of the interrupted time series analysis are summarised in Table 6. 
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 Table 6. Results for interrupted time series analysis on ED admissions of cocaine in NSW 
during January 2007 and December 2011 
Variable Estimate SE p-value 
time  -0.023 0.032 .473 
dummy variable -48.379 14.043 .001 
time*dummy 0.360 0.106 .001 
constant 8.537 3.360 .014 
The results indicate that the dummy variable is significantly negative and this confirms a drop in the 
ED admissions after June 2010, and the significant positive interaction between time and the dummy 
variable reveals that the ED admissions rose again.  
Table 7 summarizes the results of the testing. A positive sign indicates a significant positive 
relationship between the independent variable (IV) in the same row and the outcome (UP arrests or 
ED admissions) in the same column. A negative sign indicates a significant negative relationship 
between the IV in the same row and the outcome in the same column. The lag at which the 
relationship is significant is indicated in brackets.  
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 Table 7: Summary of results 
IV UP arrests ED admissions 
No. heroin seizures + (lag 0),+(lag 4) NS 
Weight heroin seizure - (lag 0),+ (lag 1),+ (lag 2) NS 
No. heroin supplier arrests + (lag 0) - (lag 2) 
No. cocaine seizures + (lag 0) + (lag 1) 
Weight cocaine seizure NS NS 
No. cocaine supplier arrests NS + (lag 2) 
No. ATS seizures + (lag 0) NS 
Weight ATS seizures NS NS 
No. ATS supplier arrests + (lag 0) NS 
Special operations on cocaine N/A N/A 
Discussion 
The principal question we sought to address in this study was whether supply reduction efforts exert 
any measurable effect on ED admissions for drug use and arrests for use and possession of drugs. The 
measures of supply reduction policy examined were monthly seizures (number and weight) and 
supplier arrests. The specific question we sought to address was whether ED admissions and UP 
arrests for heroin, cocaine and ATS in any given month are inversely related to the frequency of 
seizures and the quantity of drugs seized, either in the same month or up to four months earlier. A 
secondary question of interest was whether the reported incidence of certain drug-related offences; 
namely theft, robbery and assault, is inversely related to the frequency and quantity of heroin, cocaine 
and ATS seized. No consistent effects were found between any of the supply reduction measures and 
police reports of theft, robbery and assault.  
The associations between supply reduction variables and use and harm measures for cocaine and ATS 
were all either non-significant or positive. Increases in the number of cocaine seizures were associated 
with increases in the number of arrests for cocaine use and possession (same month) and increases in 
ED admissions for cocaine (one month later). Increases in the number of cocaine supplier arrests were 
associated with an increase in ED admissions for cocaine two months later. Increases in the number of 
ATS seizures and the number of ATS supplier arrests were associated with contemporaneous 
increases in arrests for use and possession of ATS. These findings suggest that increases in cocaine or 
ATS seizures or ATS supplier arrests are signals of increased (rather than reduced) supply.  
The only significant negative effects in the ARDL models were confined to heroin but the results for 
this drug were mixed. On the one hand, a significant negative relationship was found between the 
weight of heroin seized in a particular month and the number of persons arrested for use and 
possession of heroin in the same month. A significant negative relationship was also found between 
the number of heroin supplier arrests in a particular month and the number of ED admissions for 
heroin use two months later. These findings suggest that increases in the weight of heroin seized or 
the number of heroin supplier arrests may signal a reduction in heroin availability. This interpretation 
of the data, however, is hard to reconcile with two other findings. The first is that the number of 
heroin seizures was positively related to the number of arrests for heroin use and possession in the 
same month. The second is that the number of heroin supplier arrests was positively related to the 
number of ED admissions in the same month. The explanation for these inconsistent findings is 
unclear but the results may reflect the effects of some unobserved and unmeasured factors.  
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The results of the interrupted time series analysis were clearer. The three major operations dealing 
with cocaine listed by the NSW Crime Commission as significant (Operation Balmoral Athens, 
Operation Tempest and Operation Collage) which, over five months resulted in the arrest of 11 major 
suppliers and the seizure of 690 kg of cocaine, did bring an end to the upward trend in the rate of 
arrest for use and possession of cocaine. Prior to these operations, the number of UP arrests for 
cocaine was rising by an average of 1.21 incidents per month during the period January 2007 to May 
2010. After the operations, the frequency of UP arrests for cocaine actually fell slightly from 71to 53 
at an average rate of 0.23 incidents per month till the end of 2011. The number of ED admissions also 
fell from an average of 6.12 incidents during January 2007 to May 2010 to 3.91 incidents during June 
2010 to April 2011 before it started to bounced back again in May 2011.     
No consistent effects were found between any of the supply reduction measures and police reports of 
theft, robbery and assault (see Appendix tables A4, A5 and A6). The only significant negative effects 
in the ARDL models were confined to heroin. A significant negative relationship was found between 
the weight of heroin seized in a particular month and the number of persons arrested for use and 
possession of heroin in the same month. A significant negative relationship was also found between 
the number of heroin supplier arrests in a particular month and the number of ED admissions for 
heroin use two months later (See Table 2). These findings suggest at first sight that increases in the 
number of heroin suppliers arrested or the weight of heroin seized in a given month reduces the heroin 
consumption and heroin-related harm over the next one to two months. The problem with this 
interpretation of the data, however, is that the number of arrests for heroin use and possession was 
positively related to the number of heroin seizures in the same month. The contemporaneous 
relationship between ED admissions and heroin supplier arrests was also positive. As noted earlier, 
the positive contemporaneous relationship between the number of heroin supplier arrests and the 
number of arrests for use and possession of heroin may be due to the fact that increases in supplier 
arrests and use/possession arrests are signals of increased heroin availability. It is also possible, 
however, that they are ‘false positives’ arising from the large number of tests carried out on the data.  
As always, there are qualifications surrounding our results. It is possible that our principal outcome 
measures, UP arrests and ED admissions, are not  sensitive to changes in consumption or drug related 
harm that occur in response to variations in seizures or supplier arrests. This seems unlikely in the 
case of ED admissions because past research has shown them to have a strong inverse relationship 
with the purity-adjusted price of these drugs (Dave 2005). It is more likely with UP arrests because 
they are sometimes affected by changes in police resources or policing policy.  
It is also possible that one or more of our supply reduction measures failed to pick up changes in 
supply2. There is no reason to doubt our measurement of the weights of heroin, cocaine and ATS 
seized. In the case of seizure weight and frequency, however, we had to make a somewhat arbitrary 
judgement about what constituted a ‘significant’ seizure in terms of weight. Although this judgement 
was reached after trying out different weight thresholds to see which produced the most coherent 
pattern of results, there is no independent way of knowing whether the thresholds we finally settled on 
were of a size that would be expected to affect the use of and harms associate with heroin, cocaine 
and ATS. Supplier arrests present a similar problem. The data on supplier arrests collected by the 
ACC include all arrests for supply, regardless of the level of the drug distribution chain at which 
arrests are effected. It is entirely possible that the ‘signal’ coming from the few high level supplier 
arrests that do influence the drug market is hidden in the ‘noise’ coming from large numbers of low-
2 At one level this is obviously true. The key supply variables — proportions of heroin, cocaine and ATS seized 
— is impossible to measure since we have no independent means of ascertaining the quantities of heroin, 
cocaine and ATS entering the market. 
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level supplier arrests. Since the ACC does not record any information about the significance of each 
individual supplier arrest, there is no way to test this possibility, other than the one we pursued in 
relation to Operations Balmoral Athens, Tempest and Collage.   
Setting these issues to one side, on the whole our results are not especially favourable to the 
hypothesis that increases in seizure frequency, seizure weight and supplier arrests, within the normal 
range, are have an effect over the short-run on heroin, cocaine and ATS related harm. In only three of 
the 18 ARDL analyses did a supply reduction measure have a significant relationship with ED 
admissions (number of heroin supplier arrests, cocaine seizures, cocaine supplier arrests). In only two 
of these analyses was the expected negative relationship confirmed for one or other of the two 
outcome variables. In no analysis was it confirmed for both. The majority of significant effects 
suggested a positive relationship between the relevant measures of supply reduction activity on the 
one hand, and UP arrests and ED admissions, on the other. If UP arrests are a guide to consumption, 
increases in heroin, cocaine and ATS seizure quantity or frequency, within the normal range, are more 
likely to signal an increase rather than a reduction in drug consumption. If ED admissions are 
accepted as a guide to drug-related harm, increases in heroin, cocaine and ATS seizure quantity or 
frequency, within the normal range, have little if any impact on the harms associated with heroin, 
cocaine and ATS. It is not clear whether these results arise because the supply control measures 
examined here have no effect at all on the purity-adjusted price of the drug or because they have 
effects that are too small to influence UP arrests and ED admissions. It may be that only the very 
largest seizures, such as those that occurred in conjunction with the earlier-mentioned Operations 
Balmoral Athens, Tempest and Collage, affect the markets for heroin, cocaine and ATS.  
In the highly contested arena of drug policy, this conclusion is likely to be interpreted by some as 
evidence that investment in supply reduction policy is a waste of time and money. It is important to 
remember, however, that the present results have no bearing on the second of the two mechanisms 
through which prohibition might influence drug consumption and drug-related harm. Regardless of 
whether variations in seizures and supplier arrests have measurable effects, the severe punishments 
associated with conviction for drug cultivation, manufacture, importation and supply make these 
activities very risky. The consequent need to avoid detection makes drug production and distribution 
very inefficient. Drug traffickers compensate themselves for these risks and efficiencies by 
demanding higher premiums from those they sell to; which are then passed onto drug consumers in 
the form of higher retail drug prices. Higher retail drug prices, according to standard economic theory, 
should lead to lower levels of drug consumption. To the extent that drug-related harm is a positive 
function of drug consumption, it will also lead to lower levels of drug-related harm. We may well 
spend too much on supply reduction policy relative to other ways of reducing illicit drug consumption 
and drug related harm. The present results, however, should not be read as indicating that we can 
reduce expenditure on supply reduction initiatives without any adverse effect on drug consumption 
and drug-related harm.  
There is a strong need to replicate and extent the research carried out here but that will require 
changes to the information routinely collected by drug law enforcement agencies about their 
activities. One of the most significant limitations of the current research is that it was not possible to 
separate minor drug supply arrests from serious (high level) drug supply arrests. If the Australian 
Crime Commission were able to distinguish between arrests for drug supply that involve a large or 
commercially significant quantity of illegal drugs from those that do not, it would be possible to carry 
out a more effective analysis of the short-term relationship between supply control measures and drug 
related harm than that carried out here. It would also be interesting to see whether drug seizures or 
high level drug supply arrests influence the price and purity of illegal drugs. This sort of research, 
however, would require monthly data on the price and purity of illegal drugs seized at street level (e.g. 
from people arrested for possession of illegal drugs). The Australian Crime Commission does collect 
and publish quarterly data on the price and purity of illegal drugs. Unfortunately, quarterly 
measurement of changes in drug price and purity may be too infrequent to pick up the effects of drug 
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seizures or high level drug supply arrests. As the Commission itself points out, moreover, some 
jurisdictions do not collect any information at all on the purity of illicit drugs seized. Those that do, 
vary significantly in the way they obtain drug purity data (Australian Crime Commission 2013, p. 
195). Improvements in data collection by law enforcement agencies would greatly enhance the scope 
for rigorous evaluation of drug law enforcement policy.     
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Table A1. Summary of ARDL model results for heroin 
State Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
UP arrests ED admissions 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
NSW Number of seizures + -     +  +  
 Weight of seizures -  +   +     
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
+      + -   
VIC Number of seizures    +       
 Weight of seizures  +    -    - 
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
QLD Number of seizures   +        
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
WA Number of seizures -        +  
 Weight of seizures +       -   
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
SA Number of seizures       -    
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
    + +   + + 
TAS Number of seizures           
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
AFP Number of seizures      -    + 
 Weight of seizures     +      
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
Note: Blank cell means statistically insignificant coefficients; light grey cell with + means significant positive 
coefficients; and dark grey cell with - means significantly negative coefficients. 
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Table A2. Summary of ARDL model results for cocaine 
State Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
UP arrests ED admissions 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
NSW Number of seizures + -  +       
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
+       +   
VIC Number of seizures  + -        
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
      -    
QLD Number of seizures   -        
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
        + + 
WA Number of seizures    +       
 Weight of seizures  +     -    
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
 +         
SA Number of seizures    +       
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
TAS Number of seizures           
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
AFP Number of seizures           
 Weight of seizures    -      + 
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
Note: Blank cell means statistically insignificant coefficients; + means significant positive coefficients; and S- 
means significantly negative coefficients. 
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Table A3. Summary of ARDL model results for ATS 
State Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
UP arrests ED admissions 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
NSW Number of seizures + -         
 Weight of seizures -          
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
+          
VIC Number of seizures           
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
         + 
QLD Number of seizures       +    
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
WA Number of seizures    -       
 Weight of seizures - -         
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
SA Number of seizures           
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
     -     
TAS Number of seizures           
 Weight of seizures           
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
AFP Number of seizures          + 
 Weight of seizures    +       
 Number of supplier 
arrests 
          
Note: Blank cell means statistically insignificant coefficients; + means significant positive coefficients; and S- 
means significantly negative coefficients. 
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Number of seizures                
Weight of seizures  +   - -  + - - +    - 
Number of supplier 
arrests 




p-value    p-value    p-value    
M1 M2    M1 M2    M1 M2    
Ljung-Box test (up 
to lag 24) 
.326     .508     .272     
Engle’s LM test .966     .274     .860     
Granger causality 
test 
     p-value    p-value    
Weight of seizures      .163    .414    
Note: M1 refers the ARDL model using number and weight of seizures as independent variables; M2 refers to the model 
with number of supplier arrests as independent variable. 



































Number of seizures  - +             
Weight of seizures       +       +  
Number of supplier 
arrests 




p-value    p-value    p-value    
M1 M2    M1 M2    M1 M2    
Ljung-Box test (up 
to lag 24) 
.134 .235    .317     .794     
Engle’s LM test .680 .691    .330     .915     



































Number of seizures                
Weight of seizures                
Number of supplier 
arrests 




p-value    p-value    p-value    
M1 M2    M1 M2    M1 M2    
Ljung-Box test (up 
to lag 24) 
      .455     .616    
Engle’s LM test       .454     .854    
Granger causality 
test 
     p-value         
Number of supplier 
arrests 
     .248         
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 iSupply-reduction’ in this context refers to policies designed to reduce the supply or increase the cost of illegal 
drugs (e.g. crop eradication, drug seizures, arresting drug importers and distributors). ‘Demand reduction’ refers 
to policies designed to discourage people from using illegal drugs or encourage them to consume smaller 
quantities (e.g. drug education and treatment). ‘Harm reduction’ refers to policies designed to reduce the harms 
associated with illegal drugs (e.g. needle and syringe programs). 
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